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FOREIGN BANKS IN MEXICO: ON THE VERGE OF A NEW
ERA?*
JOHN E. ROGERS and ADRIAN ZUBIKAIRI ARRIOLA ° *
INTRODUCTION
Mexico is currently seeking to rescue its banking system from the lingering
effects of the December 1994 peso devaluation and the more recent impact of the
worldwide financial uncertainty which began with the economic turmoil in Asia in
the latter half of 1997 and intensified with the August 1998 financial crisis in
Russia. In that context, the role of foreign banks might appear to be relatively
minor, but in fact foreign banks may hold the key to the strengthening of the
Mexican banking system, through the capital and expertise which they could bring
to remedy some of the deficiencies of the Mexican system.
Foreign banks played an important role in the Mexican financial system until the
era of the Mexican Revolution, which led to a reduction in foreign investment in the
banking sector and legal restrictions which lasted until the early 1990's. With the
changes in Mexican banking laws that were implemented as a result of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the 1994 devaluation, and the
further changes which have been proposed by the Zedillo administration, which are
expected to be enacted once the crisis of the Fondo Bancariopara la Protecci6nal

Ahorro ("FOBAPROA") is resolved, Mexico may find foreign banks once more
playing a key role in the country's financial system.
I.

FOREIGN BANKS IN MEXICO 1882-1993

By 1882 foreign investors had established significant stakes in the Mexican
banking system. It has been estimated that at that time foreign investors controlled
as much as 94% of the capital of the Mexican system. Of the total foreign
investment, 60% was from France, 21% from the United States, 11% from England,
7% from Germany and 1% from the Netherlands. Banco Nacional de M6xico
("Banamex") was then controlled by French investors who owned 70% of its stock.
Investors from France also owned 46% of the capital of Banco de Londres,
Sudam6rica y M6xico ("Banco de Londres"), 60% of Banco Central Mexicano,
50% of the Banco del Estado de M6xico and 34% of Banco Peninsular Mexicano.
Major institutional investors included the Soci6t6 Financifre pour l'Industrie au
Mexique, the Soci6t6 Franco-Suisse pour l'Industrie E6trique and the Soci6t6

* Since this paper was written, important legislation was enacted in Mexico which affects foreign investment
in Mexican banks and the handling by the financial authorities of problems in the banking system. The legislation
incorporated some but not all of the elements of the Reform Bill referred to in part IV of this paper. See Ley de
Prorecci6n al Ahorro Bancarlo (Bank Savings Protection Law) and amendments to the Banco de Mdxico Law,
the Credit Institutions Law, the Capital Market Law and the Financial Groups Law, Diari Oficial de la
Federacidn,January 19, 1999, at 7.
** John E. Rogers is a member of the New York bar and the resident partner of Carlsmith Ball in Mexico
City. Adridn Zubikarai Arriola is a member of the Mexican bar and a parta of Carismith Ball and Carlsmith Ball
S.C. resident in Mexico City. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of their colleagues Frederick W.
Pfaeffle, of counsel in the Los Angeles office of the firm, and Daniel Nirdlinger, a law clerk in the Mexico City
office, in the preparation of this paper.
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Financi6re Franco-Suisse. The investments were in both commercial banks and in
specialized mortgage banks around the country.'
U.S. investors had minority interests in Banamex, Banco de Londres and others,
and controlled the Banco Internacional Hipotecario de M6xico. There was a U.S.owned institution called "American Bank" with offices in Mexico City and in
Torre6n, and trust companies such as "United States and Mexico Trust Company"
and "International Bank and Trust Company of America." Other interests were
scattered around Mexico, in various regional and small banks. British investment
seems to have been concentrated initially in the Banco de Londres, but British
investors evidently relinquished control of that bank to French and U.S. investors
at some point.2
Clearly the foreign investment during this period was
overwhelmingly European in nature, with European investors having 79% of the
total; U.S. investors were a relatively small factor, with only 21% of the total.
Banco de Londres (founded in 1864) and Banamex (founded in 188 1)3 were by
far the largest banks in Mexico during most of the administration of the
dictator/President Porfirio Dfaz (often called the "Porfiriato"), particularly from
1890 to 1911. Many of the other banks were based outside of Mexico City. In 1875
the Chihuahua state legislature chartered the Banco de Santa Eulalia, and in 1878
a similar charter was granted to the Banco Mexicano by such legislature; each bank
was owned by U.S. investors.4 The Banco de Nuevo Le6n was founded in 1891 and
grew rapidly during the Porfiriato; by 1910 it had taken the place of Banco de
Londres as the second largest bank in the country.'
During this period two key laws were enacted affecting the banking system, the
Commercial Code of 1884 and the General Law of Credit Institutions adopted in
1897, which established a set of general rules to replace a system of concessions
and privileges that greatly favored the largest banks. Nevertheless the 1897 law
ratified the position of Banamex and Banco6de Londres as the only banks authorized
to issue banknotes in the Federal District.
Domestic investment in the banking sector gradually increased during the
Porfiriato, and the reduction of British investment in Banco de Londres in favor of
local investors was encouraged or forced by President Dfaz. The other foreignowned banks were also increasingly encouraged to accept Mexican investors as
joint-venture partners.7 The Mexican Revolution began in 1910, and the
revolutionary turmoil sharply affected the foreign-owned banks; a number of them
became insolvent, and others became Mexican-owned with the sale of controlling
interests to Mexican shareholders. The only new foreign entrant into the banking
sector was National City Bank of New York (later called First National City Bank

1. Rafael J. Divila Aniaga, El sistena bancariomexicano hasta 1911, at 54 (1965) (unpublished thesis,
Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mdxico, Escuela Nacional de Econamia. Tesis (Mexico City)) (on file with
author). See also Enrique C. Creel, Finanzasde Mdxico, susbancos y su sistema monetario, Mesones 156 (1930),
Mexico City, at 17-51.
2. Divila Arriaga, supra note 1, at 55.
3. It seems that this was a branch office of London-based Bank of London and South America, which in
Mexico was known as Banco de Londres, M6xico y Sud Amdrica. See id. at 68.
4. Heliodoro Duefies, Los bancos y la Revolucidn, Editorial "Cvltvra" Mexico City (1945), at 55.
5. Dfivila Arriaga, supra note I, at 65,73.
6. Id. at 90-92.
7. Miguel S. Wionczek, ForeignBanking in Mexico, The Banker (London), Sept. 1970, at 988.
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and then Citibank), which established a branch office in 1929 primarily to finance
trade between Mexico and the U.S.'
From the end of the Revolution until 1965, it seems to have been legally possible
for additional foreign banks to establish a presence in Mexico, but economic and
political conditions were not sufficiently encouraging to foreign banks to want to
establish more than representative offices, and thus Citibank continued to be the
only foreign bank with branches in Mexico. There were, however, investments by
Banque Nationale de Paris in Banco del Atlfntico and by Banco Popular Espafiol
in Banco del Valle de Mexico (later absorbed by Banco del Athdntico). Then, just
as Mexico began to be a more attractive place for foreign investment in the early
1960's because of the rapid economic growth it had enjoyed, the General Law of
Credit Institutions was amended in 1965 to exclude foreign investment in the
banking sector. Citibank's operations were permitted to continue as before, but
they accounted for less than one percent of the assets of the Mexican banking
system as a whole and the branches were prohibited from taking savings deposits
or engaging in trust operations.'
Over the years, a large number of foreign banks came to have representative
offices in Mexico. By 1970, there were over 30 such offices in Mexico City,
representing U.S., British, Canadian, German, Spanish, French, Italian and Swiss
banks. These offices were (and still are) strictly limited as to the activities they may
perform in Mexico. One of the activities that such offices are often suspected by
the government of engaging in is that of illegally soliciting or taking deposits from
Mexicans, whether through the foreign banks' private banking units or otherwise.'"
When the Mexican debt crisis erupted in August of 1982, the Mexican
government took the dramatic step of nationalizing the Mexican banking system.
The L6pez Portillo administratiop took this action on the ground that the owners of
the banks had contributed to causing the crisis, but many viewed the government as
attempting to make the owners scapegoats for the government's own policy failures.
In any event, for the next eight or nine years, the issue of foreign bank participation
in the Mexican banking system was blunted by the fact that the system was
controlled by the government. It seemed unlikely to many during that period that
privately-held foreign banks would be permitted to participate in the Mexican
banking system if Mexican banks in general were not permitted to be owned by
private investors. However, once the Mexican banking system began to be returned
to private ownership during the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the
early 1990's, the barriers to foreign participation in the system began to weaken as
well.
II.

NAFTA AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL AFFILIATE

During the negotiation of NAFTA during the early 1990's, as the re-privatization
of the Mexican banks was occurring, one of the key objectives of the U.S.
negotiating team was to open up Mexico to investment by U.S. banks. This issue
8. Id. at 989; see also Miguel Angel Caldezin R., E/impacto de la crisisde 1929 en MJdco, Mexico City:
1982, at 49 et seq.
9. Wionczek, supra note 8, at 991.

10. Id. at 992.
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seems to have been fiercely contested by the Mexican negotiators, who were
concerned that Mexican banks, which were just returning to private ownership after
almost a decade of government control, were not prepared to compete directly with
their counterparts in the U.S. and Canada. The outcome of this part of the
negotiation was Chapter Fourteen of NAFTA on Financial Services, which
liberalized cross-border financial services between the three signatories of NAFTA,
and, more specifically, Annex VII(B) to NAFTA, which sets forth the reservations
and commitments of Mexico with respect to the establishment and operation in
Mexico of foreign-owned financial institutions."
Under Annex VII(B), Mexico agreed to a gradual opening of its financial system
to foreign investment on the condition that (among other things) such investment
would have to be through Mexican subsidiaries rather than branches.' 2 One of the
arguments for this requirement was that it was necessary to ensure the Mexican
government's control over the country's money supply. However, because it meant
that a foreign bank's Mexican subsidiary's operations would be limited by the
subsidiary's capital rather than by the capital of its parent bank, the requirement had
the effect of substantially reducing the capacity and usefulness of a foreign bank's
Mexican operations, at least until such time as the limitations on the size of such
subsidiary might be loosened. Citibank would have been permitted to continue
operating through branches, but if it had done so it would not have been entitled to
any of the benefits of Annex VII(B), including the eventual elimination of the size
restrictions. Evidently for this reason, Citibank eventually decided to convert its
Mexican branches into a subsidiary operation.' 3
The gradual opening under Annex VII(B) to foreign commercial banks, securities
firms, insurance companies and nonbank banks was structured so that during a sixyear transition period their capital participation would be limited to specified
percentages of the total capital of the corresponding part of the financial system.
In the case of commercial banks, the maximum capital that would be authorized for
a Mexican subsidiary of a foreign bank organized under the laws of the U.S. or
Canada was to be 1.5% of the total capital of the Mexican banking system. In
addition, the aggregate capital of all of the Mexican subsidiaries of U.S. and
Canadian banks was not to exceed 8% of the total capital of the Mexican
commercial banking system, with this aggregate limit to gradually increase to 15%
of such total capital by the end of the transition period (i.e., by January 1, 2000)."
At the end of this transition period, the subsidiaries will cease to be subject to the
limitations except that, if the aggregate capital of all such foreign-owned
subsidiaries should exceed 25% of the total capital of the Mexican banking system
prior to the end of 2003, Mexico can exercise a safeguard provision in Annex
VII(B) that would slow the growth of the foreign bank presence. Under this
provision, participation of the foreign-owned subsidiaries would be frozen at the

11. North American Free Trade Agreement. drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992. U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.LM. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFIA], Article Fourteen, Annex VII(B) - Mexico.
12. Under Article 7 of the Credit Institutions Law or Ley de Instituciones de Crfdio. Diario Oficial de la
Federacidn, December 23, 1993 (Second Section), [hereinafter CIL], branches of foreign banks may be authorized,
but only to engage in transactions with persons not resident in Mexico.
13. Cf. NAFrA Annex VII(B).
14. Id. at paragraph 9.
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percentage of the system's total capital existing at the time the freeze is imposed,
but the freeze could not be in effect for more than three years.'" It is noteworthy
that although NAFTA was intended to primarily benefit investors from its three
signatory countries, the agreement permitted institutions based outside of North
America to take advantage of the provisions as to the market opening in Mexico so
long as they utilized operating subsidiaries organized under the laws of the U.S. or
Canada as the vehicles for their investment in Mexico.
NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994, but in anticipation of it coming
into force, Mexico enacted amendments (also effective on January 1, 1994) to its
Ley de Institucionesde Cridito(Credit Institutions Law or CIL) which gave effect
to the provisions of Annex VII(B) with respect to commercial banks (or6
instituciones de banca miltiple, as commercial banks are called under that law).'
The new Mexican subsidiaries of foreign banks would be permitted to be formed
as Foreign Financial Affiliates of foreign financial institutions, and could either be
stand-alone banks or operate as members of foreign-owned financial groups formed
under amended provisions of the Financial Groups Law (Ley de Agrupaciones
7
Each of these laws now contains a chapter on "Affiliates" or
Financieras).1
"Holding Company Affiliates" of Foreign Financial Institutions, prescribing the
rules for investment by such institutions in their Mexican bank subsidiaries or
financial group holding company subsidiaries. Such subsidiaries must be organized
under Mexican law and have at least 99 percent of their capital stock held by the
foreign financial institution."
To implement these new provisions, on April 21, 1994 the Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit (the Secretarfa de Hacienday Cridito Pablico or "SHCP") of

Mexico published its Rules for the Establishment of Affiliates of Foreign Financial
Institutions, prescribing the procedures for applications by foreign financial
institutions for authorizations by the SHCP to establish Affiliates or Holding
Company Affiliates under the CIL, the LRFG, the Securities Market Law and
related laws.' 9 Since that date over 100 applications were made to the SHCP and
many of such applications were approved. By September 1996, 69 Affiliates had
been authorized and were operating, of which there were 17 banks, 9 securities
firms, 11 financial leasing companies, 5 financial factoring companies, 10 nonbank
banks, 15 insurance companies and 2 bonding companies.20
Based on the membership of the Association of International Financial
Institutions (Asociaci6nde Instituciones FinancierasInternacionalesS.C. or AIFI)

in mid-August 1998, at least seventeen Mexican bank subsidiaries of foreign banks
were operating, including at least four as members of financial groups. Ten of the

15. Id.
16. CIL, supra note 12, at 12.
17. Law to Regulate Fmancial Groups or Ley de Agrupaciones Financieras, D.O., Dec. 23, 1993 (Second

Section) [hereinafter LRFG].
18.

Cf. CIL Arts. 45-A to 45-N, and LRFG Arts. 27-A to 27-N. For further detail and analysis, cf. John E.

Rogers & Adrin Zubikarai A., Recent changes to Mexican controls on foreign investment in financial institutions,
64 BNA's Banking Report 935 (1995).
19. "Reglas para el Establecimniento de Filiales de Instituciones Financieras del Exterior," D.O., April 21,
1994.
20. Secretarfa de Hacienda y Crtdito Pdblico, Directory of Foreign Financial Intermediaries, Sept. 1996.
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banks were owned by U.S. institutions," and of the remainder, two are owned by
French banks, two by Dutch banks, one by a Spanish bank, one by a Japanese bank
and one by a German bank, although it appears that the European and Japanese
institutions utilized subsidiaries in the U.S. or Canada as vehicles for their
investments. Interestingly, so far no Canadian bank has established a subsidiary as
an Affiliate under the NAFTA-inspired provisions of the CIL. However, a couple
of Canadian banks have acquired significant interests in existing banks, pursuant
to 1995 amendments to the CIL and LRFG (see part III below),22 which may at
some point convert into Affiliates.
AIFI members also included two Mexican securities firms or casas de bolsa
(owned by Bankers Trust and Goldman Sachs),23 seven nonbank banks and 64 bank
representative offices, representing banks from Germany (9), the United States (7),
Spain (7), France (7), Japan (5), Canada (4), the United Kingdom (4), Switzerland
(3), Italy (2), Belgium (2), South Korea (2), multilateral institutions (2), Israel (2),
Netherlands (1), Australia (1) and various countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean (6). In addition, four foreign securities firms have representative offices
that are AIFI members.2
Im. THE FEBRUARY 1995 OPENING
When it had become clear that the December 1994 devaluation, and the financial
crisis that resulted therefrom, would imperil the solvency of the Mexican banking
system, the government determined to go beyond its NAFTA commitments and
make it possible for foreign banks to provide additional capital to the system.
Further amendments to the CIL were enacted in February 1995, which made it
possible for foreign banks to acquire up to 100% of the capital of existing Mexican
banks through "programs approved by the [SHCP] for the purpose of converting the
respective multiple banking institution into an Affiliate."'2 However, these 1995
Amendments excluded any bank with capital exceeding 6% of the total capital of
the banking system- then meaning the three largest banks, Banamex, Bancomer
and Banca Serfin - from eligibility for any such foreign takeover.26 This would
change under the amendments proposed by the Zedillo administration in March of
1998 (see part IV below).
21. Two additional U.S.-owned Affiliates were on the SHCP list by Sept. 1998. Telephone conversation
with SHCP on Sept. 1, 1998.
22. As of August 13, 1998, such bank subsidiaries were said to be those of ABN AMRO Bank, American

Express Company, Bank of Boston, Banco Santander de Negocios, Bank of America. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi,
Banque Nationale de Paris, Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Comerica Bank, Dresdner Bank, First Chicago Bank

NBD, GE Capital, ING Barings, J.P. Morgan, Republic National Bank of New York and Socidtd Gdndrale. Of
these, according to the Asociacidn de Instituciones Financieras Intenacionales S.C. [hereinafter AI]

membership list the four that are members of Mexican finmcial groups formed under the LRFG were Chase,
Citibank, ING Barings and J.P. Morgan. Affiliates of Nations Bank, Fuji Bank and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya appear
not to be members of the AIFL
23. SHCP has indicated that authorizations for securities Affiliates have also been granted to Bankers Trust,
ING Barings. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Merrill Lynch. See note 20 above.
24. Fax message dated Aug. 13, 1998 from AIFI to Carlsmith Ball.

25. "Decreto que reforma, adiciona y deroga disposiciones de laLey para Regular Agrupaciones

Financieras, de laLey de Instituciones d Crddito y de Ia Ley del Mercado de Valores," D.O., Feb. 15, 1995
[hereinafter the 1995 Amendments].

26. Id.
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In the four years since the adoption of the 1995 Amendments, there have been
only four cases known to the authors in which foreign banks have taken control of
Mexican banks: (i) Banco Bilbao Vizcaya acquired control of Probursa; (ii) Banco
Santander purchased control of Banco Mexicano; (iii) The Bank of Nova Scotia
acquired control of Banco Inverlat; and (iv) GE Capital purchased control of Banco
Alianza. Given the continuing limitations on foreign investment in the three largest
banks, the foreign stakes in the most troubled of the three, Banca Serffn, have been
limited to less than 20%. The Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation has
acquired slightly less than 20% of the capital of Serfn and it has been reported that
J.P. Morgan has also acquired slightly less than 9% of the stock of Serffn. The
Bank of Montreal has also acquired a significant interest in Bancomer, and Spanish
and Portuguese banks have obtained interests in Banco Internacional, now called
Bital, which recently merged with Banco del Atldntico.
It soon became clear that the 1995 Amendments were not going to be enough, in
the short and medium term, to solve the problems of the Mexican banking system.
Many of the possible foreign bank candidates either were reluctant to purchase a
Mexican bank until they had more information about the condition of such banks,
or had other priorities in terms of expansion in their home countries or in foreign
countries other than Mexico. Others may have been constrained by concerns about
Mexican laws and regulations that might affect the profitability of a Mexican
banking franchise. In any event, the Mexican government soon began to
concentrate on other mechanisms for assisting the banking system, including
intervening in the most troubled banks and in acquiring the weakest portions of the
loan portfolios of the somewhat more secure banks. In each approach, the
government came to rely heavily on programs directed by the Banking Fund for the
Protection of Savings (the Fondo Bancario para la Protecci6n del Ahorro or
FOBAPROA). In the latter case, the problem loans were typically acquired by
FOBAPROA against issuance by it to the selling bank of government notes. By
early 1998, it was estimated that FOBAPROA was administering loans with a face
value equivalent to as much as U.S. $61 billion or more.
IV.

THE 1998 PROPOSALS

In early 1998, the Zedillo administration developed a financial reform package
which it proposed to the Mexican Congress.' The package would effect numerous
changes to the financial system with respect to the operation and role of
FOBAPROA, the conversion of FOBAPROA obligations into public debt, the
structure and powers of the National Banking and Securities Commission (the
Comisi6n NacionalBancariay de Valores or CNBV) and a variety of other matters.
With regard to the issue of foreign investment in the banking sector, the package
would eliminate most remaining restrictions on such investment. The proposed
changes would, in large part, focus on changes in the classifications of the shares
of capital stock issued by Mexican banks (the portion of the package that would

27. The proposed package is contained in two letters dated March 26, 1998 from President Zedillo to the
secretaries of the Chamber of Deputies of the Mexican Congress.
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affect the supervision of the banking system and foreign investment in the banks is
herein sometimes referred to as the "Reform Bill").
Under the Reform Bill, the CIL and the LRFG would be amended to eliminate
the existing classifications of shares of bank capital stock.2" Under current law, at
least 51% of a bank's capital must be represented by class "A" shares, and the
remaining shares are to be class "B" shares or, as noted below, class "L" shares.29
With some noted exceptions, as set forth below, current law restricts ownership of
class "A" shares to Mexican nationals." Although taken alone class "B" shares are
currently generally unrestricted as to foreign ownership, the current law generally
provides that no one, including foreigners, acquire more than 5% of class "A" and
"B" shares, collectively, of any bank.3"
Current law provides the SHCP with the authority to consent to a transfer of up
to 20% of class "A" and "B" shares to any one party, provided that control of the
bank does not end up in the hands of foreigners.32 In addition, if the capital of the
Mexican bank being acquired does not exceed 6% of the sum of the net capital of
all Mexican banks, the SHCP has the power to approve a foreign financial
institution's acquisition of greater than 20% of class "A" and "B" shares of a
Mexican bank, but only if the acquisition is for the purpose of setting up a Mexican
affiliate of the foreign institution under the provisions of the CIL relating to foreign
financial affiliates.33 In place of the present system of "A" and "B" shares, the
proposed changes to the CIL and LRFG would authorize a single category of shares
for Mexican banks. The new class would be designated class "O," and foreigners
would not be prohibited from owning class "0" shares due simply to their foreign
status (unless they are foreign governmental authorities or agencies).35
Under current law, upon obtaining approval from the CNBV a Mexican bank
may also issue a third class of stock, class "L" shares, in addition to class "A" and
"B" shares.36 The proposed law would also allow banks to issue class "L" shares
in addition to class "0"shares.37 Class "L" shares have limited voting rights, but
may have the right to a cumulative preferred dividend.3" Class "L" shares may not
represent more than 40% of the total capital of any bank.39 Neither the current law
nor the Reform Bill prevent foreigners from owning class "L" shares. 4°
Under the proposed changes to the CIL and the LRFG, the sale or acquisition of
more than 2% of a bank's class "0"shares would have to be reported to the CNBV
within 3 business days of the transfer.4 '

28.

Cf. CI, supra note 12, Art. 11, second paragraph.

29. CIL, supra note 12, Art. 13(1).
30. CI., supra note 12, Art. 14, first paragraph, and Art. 19, first paragraph.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

CIL, supra note 12, Art. 17, first paragraph.
Id. This authority was granted pursuant to the 1995 Amendments.
Cf. CU, supra note 12, Art. 17(VI) and penultimate paragraph of Art. 17.
CIH, supra note 12, Art. I I under the Reform Bill.
CH, supra note 12, Art. 13 under the Reform Bill.
CI, supra note 12, Art. 12.
CIL, supra note 12, Art. 11 under the Reform Bill.
CI., supra note 12, Art. 12.
CR, supra note 12, Art. 11 under the Reform Bill.
Cf. CIL, supra note 12, Art. 12.
C11, supra note 12, Art. 14 under the Reform Bill.
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. As with class "A" and "B" shares under current law, an individual's ownership
of a bank's class "0"shares under the Reform Bill would be limited to 5% of the
bank's total outstanding shares. 2 Yet, as under the current law, the Reform Bill
would also allow an individual to increase his percentage ownership in class "0"
shares to up to 20% of a bank's total capital upon obtaining approval therefor from
the Mexican authorities, although under the Reform Bill the approval would have
to be obtained from the CNBV instead of from the SHCP.43 Moreover, the new law
would grant the CNBV powers similar to those of the SHCP under the current law
to approve a foreign financial institution's acquisition of greater than 20% of the
class "0"shares of a bank for the purpose of the setting up a Mexican affiliate of
the foreign institution.' In addition, the proposed law would also grant power to
the CNBV to permit a foreign financial institution to acquire greater than 20% of
a bank's capital if the shares of said entity are being acquired under a program
deemed by the CNBV to "advance the existing functions" of the bank being
acquired.45
The key change in this regard would be the elimination of the limitation in the
current law that prevents a foreign financial institution from obtaining approval of
the authorities for acquiring a Mexican bank which has a capital stock that exceeds
6% of the total capital of all of the Mexican commercial banks. 6 In other words,
the Reform Bill would open up the possibility of foreign banks acquiring any of the
three largest banks in Mexico, i.e. Banamex, Bancomer or Serffn. Of the three,
Serfin seems the most likely to acquire a foreign owner, in that it has been the one
in the greatest financial difficulty and it already has two foreign shareholders with
significant stakes who have indicated an interest in increasing their shares.
Under the proposed changes to the CIL and LRFG, the board of directors of a
bank would have to consist of 15 members, instead of the 11 members required by
current law. However, the provision for the possibility of separate classes of
members representing different classes of shares would be eliminated, since the
only class of voting shares would be class "0"(class "L" shares do not have the
right to vote for Board members).4 7 As under the current law, all board members
would have to reside within Mexico, although they may be foreigners.48
Except with reference to the CNBV taking over the duties and powers of the
SHCP, and provisions for the new class "0" shares, in all material respects Chapter
II of the CIL and Chapter II of the LRFG, which govern bank Affiliates and
Holding Company Affiliates, respectively, would remain unchanged under the
Reform Bill. Nonbank banks (sociedadesfinancieras de objeto limitado or
SOFOLs)
would be regulated under the Reform Bill by the CNBV instead of the
49
SHCP.

42. CI, supranote 12, Art. 17 (currently and under the Reform Bill).
43. C1L, supra note 12, Art. 17, first paragraph, under the Reform Bill.
44. C11, supra note 12, Arts. 17(VID and 17 bis under the Reform Bill.
45. CIL, supranote 12, Art. 17(VII) under the Reform Bill.
46. CH, supranote 12, Art. 17, penultimate paragraph.
47. Compare CU. supra note 12, Art. 22, as now in effect with the provision under the Reform Bill.
48. Compare CL, supra note 12, Art. 23, last paragraph, as now in effect with the provision under the
Reform Bill.

49. CIL, supra note 12, Art. 103(W) under the Reform Bill.
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The Reform Bill is currently under consideration by the Congress, where it has
been stalled by opposition charges that FOBAPROA has been inefficient and
corrupt, and has enabled wealthy bankers and businessmen to profit from the system
while leaving depositors and taxpayers at risk. The portions of the Reform Bill
pertaining to opening up the banking system to greater foreign investment have
received much less prominence. The general expectation is that, whatever happens
to the FOBAPROA portion of the Reform Bill, the bank regulatory and investment
portions are likely to be approved eventually by the Congress substantially as
proposed by the Zedillo administration.
V.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

In weighing the likely effects of the Reform Bill on the future of foreign banks
in Mexico, there are at least three aspects to keep in mind, which may be
summarized as regulatory, legal/environmental and industry/environmental.
"Regulatory" aspects would include the issue of permitted foreign ownership of
Mexican banks, as well as the regulatory framework affecting Mexican banks in
general. The "legal/environmental" issues would refer to the other legal conditions
affecting bank activities in Mexico, including the enforceability of bank loan
obligations, the effects of the Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments Law (the Ley
de Quiebras y de Suspensin de Pagos or "Bankruptcy Law"), the conditions
affecting collateral security for bank loans and conditions affecting the ability of
banks (or their financial group affiliates) to engage in activities other than
traditional lending. The "industry/environmental" issues would be those affecting
the activities of banks worldwide and particularly of the banks that are potential
investors in Mexico.
The "regulatory" aspects of the Reform Bill seem, overall, to encourage greater
investment by foreign financial institutions in the Mexican banking system. The
three largest Mexican banks would become available for investment in up to 100%
of their voting capital, as well as in any percentage of their limited-voting "L"
shares, by foreign institutions under programs approved by the CNBV. The
simplification of the share classes, by replacing "A" and "B" classes with a single
"0"voting class, should provide for greater flexibility in shareholdings by foreign
institutions. The replacement of the two classes of Board members with a single
class is a further step in the direction of simplification. In addition, the Reform
Bill's strengthening of the CNBV as a quasi-independent supervisory body separate
from the SHCP may provide greater objectivity in supervisory decision-making.
The main "regulatory" barrier remaining is perhaps the prohibition on foreign banks
operating direct branches in Mexico.-5 This prohibition means that foreign banks
are constrained in using their entire capital strengths in making loans to Mexican
borrowers through their local presence. However, given that corporate borrowers
often seek dollar-denominated rather than peso-denominated loans because of the
lower interest rates that have applied to dollar loans, such loans can be made at least

50. Except for the branches permitted under Cu. supra note 12, Art. 7 for offshore transactions. C. note
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as easily by the U.S. or other offices of a foreign bank as they could through any
Mexican branch thereof.
For any foreign bank considering the acquisition of an existing Mexican bank,
the key concern is normally going to be with respect to the Mexican bank's loan
portfolio. Some steps have recently been taken to loosen bank-secrecy restrictions
to enable prospective purchasers of a Mexican bank, as well as prospective
purchasers of part of a bank's loan portfolio or of the right to service and collect any
of such loans, to perform the kind of due diligence exercise (in terms of reviewing
credit files, loan documentation, any litigation files, etc.) necessary to enable it to
determine the quality and value of such loans. FOBAPROA has recently made
substantial efforts to facilitate this process with respect to the loan portfolios that
are under its supervision or control, and has overseen several recent auctions of
such portfolios. The agency appears disposed to provide similar assistance in
connection with the purchase of entire banks.
The prospects for improvements on the "legal/environmental" side are less
encouraging than on the regulatory front. Many of those involved in the
FOBAPROA debate, who have focused on the issue of self-dealing by bankers and
other corrupt lending practices, seem to have lost sight of those aspects of the legal
environment that helped to produce the high level of problem loans, e.g. the
antiquated Bankruptcy Law and laws governing collateral security, the difficulties
involved in the enforcement of loan obligations (including the frequent use by
debtors of amparo proceedings"' to prevent enforcement of such obligations) and
formalistic aspects of the corporate laws which provide many traps for unwary
bankers. 52 The availability to banks of reliable credit information is still limited,
particularly with respect to consumers, because of strict bank-secrecy restrictions
that have until recently prevented the development of effective credit bureaus.5 3
The "industry/environmental" aspects are more difficult for Mexican lawmakers
and regulators to address, since they involve rapidly changing industry conditions
and trends as well as laws and regulations in other countries. In general,
commercial banks worldwide are finding themselves in competition with a wide
variety of institutions, including securities firms and investment banks, insurance
companies, pension funds and nonbank banks. The profitability of traditional bank
loans has declined while their risk and drain on capital and reserves have increased.
Banks find themselves competing increasingly with the commercial paper market
as well as the stock and bond markets for the business of large corporate customers.
As a result, many large commercial banks have sought to enter these other markets,
either directly or (where legal restrictions apply, as in the United States) indirectly.
In lending to the middle market, banks are now competing with commercial finance
companies and other nonbank banks. In retail banking, the industry is rapidly
consolidating and many smaller and midsize banks are being absorbed or forced out
51. Proceedings for the enforcement of protections provided under the Mexican Constitution.
52. See, e.g., s Castruita, Impiden las leyes en Mixico un buenfuncionaniento del sistena bancario,
El Economista (Mexico City), May 21, 1998, at 27; and Alicia Salgado, El saqueo de empresas aumenid las
pdrdidas: CNBV, El Financiero (Mexico City), May 21, 1998, at 7. These articles report on statements made by
Eduardo FernAndez, chairman of the CNBV.
53. This situation is changing due to recent amendments to LRFG Arts. 33 and 33-A, permitting exceptions
to the bank secrecy rules with respect to credit bureaus (called "credit information companies" or sociedades de
infomracidn crediticia); also see CL, supra note 12, Art. 117.
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of the businesses of consumer lending, deposit-taking and credit-card issuance.
Burdensome regulation and reserve requirements, lender-liability risks, stockmarket sensitivity and intense competition in many countries, among other things,
make commercial banking a difficult and sometimes unrewarding business. Added
to this at times is a high level of volatility in international currency and capital
markets, particularly in emerging markets, which makes many banks reluctant to
expand internationally to places such as Mexico. Rapid technological changes raise
questions about the relative utility of extensive branch systems.
Besides, such banks often find, when they examine conditions in Mexico, that
some of the activities in which they engage or are seeking to develop within other
countries are difficult to develop in Mexico.' For example, the widespread loan
participation markets in the U.S. and other countries face obstacles in Mexico due
to restrictions on the legal right of Mexican banks to assign or sell participations in
their loans.55 The ability of banks to securitize large portions of their portfolios of
mortgage loans, consumer loans or credit-card receivables, enabling them to free up
their capital to make additional loans, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish in Mexico.'
On the other hand, restrictions in some countries
(particularly the United States) on banks or their affiliates engaging in the insurance
or securities businesses do not exist to the same extent in Mexico, which permits
a variety of financial services to be offered by members of a single financial group
under the provisions of the LRFG.
CONCLUSION
Some of the legal conditions for an expansion of the foreign bank presence in
Mexico were established in the wake of NAFTA and then the December 1994
devaluation. Further steps would be taken in this direction with the enactment of
the Reform Bill, although the Reform Bill would not lift the restriction on foreign
branches. The Mexican regulatory authorities would appear to be strengthened and
made more effective as a result of the Reform Bill, and they have already indicated
a willingness to assist prospective buyers of the more troubled banks, with the
purpose of encouraging further capital injections into the banking system. However,
it appears that foreign banks must wait longer for other improvements in the
Mexican legal environment, with respect to the laws affecting bankruptcy, collateral
security and loan enforcement.
The rapid changes in the banking industry worldwide will cause some banks to
wait for industry trends to be clearer before they commit substantial funds to
establishing a significant presence in Mexico. Other banks will probably elect to
push ahead with such investments in the interest of acquiring a market share in
Mexico that will perhaps enable them to compete more easily later on, and possibly
54. In general, see John E. Rogers, Mexican Corporate Banking in a North American Market, Mexico

Trade & L Rep., Sept. 1992, at 3, reprinted at Philip T. Von Mehren, ed., Doing Business in Mexico, New York:
1993, Part Nine, Chap. 3.
55. Cf. CIL, supra note 12, Art. 93. The Reform Bill would loosen but not eliminate this restriction.
56. Part of the problem is with CIL, supra note 12, Art. 93, but there are other problems with mortgage
loans, relating to requirements that mortgage zecordations be amended upon the loans being assigned. Some creditcard receivables have been securntized, but largely through offshore transactions which might be difficult to carry
out with some portfolios.
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to be better positioned to face any future legal restrictions, as there may be some
risk that Mexico will react to the heavy costs to it of globalization by turning inward
and becoming nationalistic again with respect to its banking industry. Each
potential approach by the foreign banks will have its defenders and detractors.
Presumably the next few years will demonstrate which approach is the wiser one.

